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Much has been written on the Canadian Corps and the string of victories that it achieved 
after its initial triumph at Vimy Ridge.1 The corps 
did not have a perfect record after Vimy, although 
the battles are often depicted as such. The attack 
on the town of Lens in August 1917 demonstrated 
that the corps was still capable of making 
mistakes that were extremely costly in casualties 
and did not garner any sort of victory. 
 Examining the battle of Lens will dispel 
some of the myths. The brief literature on Hill 
70 and Lens has always lumped them together 
as a single battle with a victorious outcome.2 
In fact, this is misleading. The attack on Lens, 
which immediately followed the highly successful 
assault on Hill 70, was a defeat, and an avoidable 
one. Hill 70 was an operation involving 14 
assaulting battalions launched on a much wider 
front than the seven attacking battalions that led 
the assault into Lens. Lens was not a probing 
assault that followed the success of Hill 70 – it 
was a set-piece battle that the Canadian Corps 
Headquarters planned in July.3 This paper will 
show why the same sort of set-piece battle plan 
the Canadians applied with such success at Vimy 
Ridge and Hill 70 failed at Lens. 
  The Third Battle of Ypres, otherwise known 
as Passchendaele, began on 31 July when 
General Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army launched the 
British attack on Pilkem Ridge.4 On 7 July, Field 
Marshal Douglas Haig ordered a simultaneous 
diversionary attack at Lens in order to draw 
German forces away from the primary British 
front.5 Haig was right. In the German official 
history, Der Weltkrieg, Hermann von Kuhl 
wrote: 
The situation in Crown Prince Rupprecht’s army 
group was serious and caused its commander 
considerable worry. With anxiety, he had to look 
at other fronts, to the areas of Lens, Arras and 
St. Quentin, where an enemy attack could be 
expected at any time, even if it took the form of 
a secondary attack.6 
The Canadian Corps spent the next month 
preparing for this attack at the behest of General 
Henry Horne, commander of the British First 
Army, which at the time had the Canadian Corps 
attached. 
 The forthcoming operations at Lens would 
be Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie’s first as 
corps commander. From the outset, he was 
concerned about the implications of attacking 
Lens from the front as Field Marshal Haig had 
requested. Indeed, on receiving the order, he 
had climbed a high point behind the Canadian 
lines (near Bois de l’Hirondelle) and lay there the 
entire morning, carefully surveying the terrain. 
Lens was situated between the Salaumines Hills 
to the southeast and Hill 70 to the north. Currie 
concluded that the Canadian Corps would suffer 
enormous casualties if it attacked Lens without 
neutralizing these heights. A direct assault on 
Lens would mean that the corps would have to 
deploy its troops and artillery on the Douai plain 
in front of its objective,7 providing the German 
artillery with excellent targets. On 10 July, 
having scouted the proposed battlefield, Currie 
approached General Horne and recommended 
an alternative plan.8 Realizing the cost in lives 
of a direct attack on Lens, Currie insisted that 
it made more tactical sense to capture Hill 70, 
hopefully causing the German defence of Lens to 
collapse and either forcing the enemy to evacuate 
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6the city or to try to retake the heights.9 However, 
it was understood that even after taking Hill 
70 the Canadian Corps might still be required 
to enter Lens. The assumption was that its 
defences would be considerably weakened.10 
Changing Haig’s and Horne’s original plan was 
a bold move considering that Currie had been 
corps commander for barely a month. Horne, 
however, was persuaded by Currie’s arguments, 
and authorized the Canadian general and his staff 
to proceed with the new plan. 
 After a delay of two weeks because of 
poor weather, time Canadian gunners used to 
extend the “softening-up” bombardment, the 
1st and 2nd Divisions assaulted Hill 70 on the 
morning of 15 August. The attack on Hill 70 
was a textbook example of how a set-piece battle 
should be carried out, with only minor setbacks 
suffered by two of the brigades.11 There was 
massive artillery support before and during 
the assault, the objectives set for the infantry 
were limited, and machine guns were employed 
to an unprecedented degree in support of the 
advancing troops and to defend captured terrain. 
The Canadians had the energy and time to dig 
into their new positions and wait for the German 
counterattacks.12 Moreover, the enemy responded 
as Currie had predicted, launching numerous 
counterattacks over the next four days, many of 
them broken up by the Canadian artillery and 
machine guns with heavy losses to the Germans.13 
On the night of 18 August, after four days of hard 
fighting, Currie wrote in his diary: 
There were no fewer than twenty-one counter-
attacks delivered, many with very large forces 
and all with great determination and dash….Our 
casualties so far about 5600 but in my opinion 
the enemy casualties must be close to 20,000. 
Our gunners, machine-gunners and infantry 
never had such targets, F[orward]O[bservation]O
[fficer]s could not get guns for all their targets… 
It was a great and wonderful victory. G.H.Q. 
regard it as one of the finest performances of 
the war…14 
Currie’s estimates of the German casualties, 
though unsubstantiated,  point to how 
overwhelmingly successful the Hill 70 operation 
had been. Victories of this proportion seldom 
happened on the Western Front. With this battle 
the Canadian Corps had achieved the goals that 
had been set out for it by British High Command 
and had drained away German units that would 
otherwise have been of use in the Ypres salient, 
specifically the three divisions sent to the Hill 70 
area between 15 and 20 August.15 However, the 
Canadian Corps, now holding the high ground 
and flush with victory, looked down from Hill 70 
and decided to press on and attack Lens. This 
proved to be a costly mistake.
 In the official history, Nicholson aptly 
described Lens as “the center of the most crowded 
coal-mining area in France…which lay in partial 
Right: Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie (at right, pointing), commander 
of the Canadian Corps, devised a brilliant plan for the Hill 70 battle, but 
was less successful in his attempt to capture the city of Lens.
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7ruin, encircled by a wreath of shattered pithead 
installations.”16 Certainly, its ruins offered plenty 
of strongpoints for the German defences. In the 
lead up to the attack on Hill 70, the 4th Division 
had been sending raiding parties into Lens as 
part of a diversionary effort to make the Germans 
think that the main attack would fall on the town 
rather than the nearby heights. These raids had 
made it clear that, wishful thinking at Corps 
headquarters aside, the Germans would mount 
a strong defence of the city. 
 Nonetheless, pushing the Germans out of 
Lens was always part of the Canadian plan if 
the Hill 70 operation was successful. This is 
demonstrated in the corps’ orders released in 
late July 1917, which emphasized that “offensive 
operations with the ultimate object of the capture 
of LENS are to be continued by the Canadian 
Corps.”17 In light of the substantial German 
reinforcements already thrown at Hill 70, it is 
likely that the pressure from Horne and Haig to 
draw away still more divisions from Ypres must 
have been substantial.18 Indeed, a month after 
the Canadian debacle at Lens, the British High 
Command was still pushing the corps to take the 
city.19 
 Currie should have realized that if the 
German garrison chose to stand and fight, the 
task of taking Lens was completely different from 
(and much more difficult than) the capture of Hill 
70, and quite possibly best avoided. But with 
the capture of Hill 70, the Canadian command 
appears to have felt that they were now in a 
favourable position to assault the city, and Currie 
and his staff planned to repeat what they had 
done so successfully only days earlier at Hill 70. 
Though the attack on Lens would not have the 
element of surprise that the initial attack had had, 
the corps’ leadership felt that the combination of 
limited objectives, ample artillery support and 
solid intelligence would once more guarantee 
success. 
 A significant difference between the Hill 70 
operation and the Lens attack was that the troops 
did not prepare for Lens in the same manner as 
the attack on Hill 70. In the latter case, the assault 
troops had moved into position on 18 and 19 
July and had gone through detailed rehearsals 
over taped courses so that by the time the attack 
was carried out on 15 August the troops had a 
thorough knowledge of the tactics to be used and 
objectives to be gained.20 Lens, however, was a 
different story. The 4th Division had been in front 
of Lens for a month before its scheduled attack, 
and had been constantly raiding the city for over 
three weeks. However, instructions as to which 
brigades (and battalions) would be used and 
what objectives the assault hoped to achieve were 
only handed down from Division between the 
16 and 18 August.21 The attacks were supposed 
to fall on the morning of the 20th, “but were 
postponed to the 21st, owing to preparations not 
having been completed.”22 Basically, the artillery 
supporting the 1st and 2nd Division lines had to 
be reoriented on Lens instead of Hill 70, and the 
assault troops were not all in position.23
 Currie’s plan called for the 2nd and 4th 
Divisions to take part in this attack. While the 
planned advance was not deep, the route lay 
through ruined buildings, and with a width of 
3,000 yards, was considered a broad front. 
The 2nd Division was to occupy Cinnabar 
and Combat trenches in the suburb of Cité St. 
Elizabeth, located just north of the center of 
Lens, while the 4th Division was assigned Aloof, 
Aconite, and Alpaca trenches which ran through 
the Lens city centre. The plan further called for 
the troops that took Aloof and Combat trenches, 
the 4th and 2nd Divisions’ adjacent flanks, to link 
up, forming a continuous advance line.24 
 On 18 August, the corps commander and 
his staff set 21 August for the launch of the Lens 
operation.25 The Canadian infantry would now 
be undertaking urban combat, an entirely new 
venture for which they had no training. A private 
who took part in the assault remembered his 
foreboding at the prospect: 
You see, the houses were built in long rows and 
they had knocked bricks out of each house and 
built a tunnel through. You could move two or 
three streets, out of sight. Don’t forget this, the 
Germans had been there for about twelve or 
thirteen months.26 
2nd Division Attack
At 0435 hours on the morning of 21 August the 27th and 29th Battalions would lead the 
initial assault on Lens with the 28th Battalion 
in immediate support and the 31st Battalion in 
reserve. The artillery coverage for the units, all of 
the 6th Brigade, was similar to that which the 2nd 
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8Division had enjoyed at Hill 70 – 102 18-pounder 
field guns, twenty-four 4.5-inch howitzers and 
twenty-eight medium and heavy howitzers. 
In addition, several heavy artillery pieces had 
been set aside purely for counter-battery work, 
and Army Headquarters also added additional 
artillery to support the 2nd Division’s assault in 
the form of the British 63rd Artillery Group.27 
 By 0345 hours, the two battalions had 
assumed their positions in the jump-off line. 
Carl von Clausewitz wrote that no other activity 
is as continuously or universally bound up with 
chance as war.28 As chance would have it, the 
Germans and Canadians attacked each other 
on this frontage almost simultaneously. Since 
0300 hours, the Germans had been shelling 
the Canadian front lines, the rate continuing to 
increase as the morning progressed. At 0425 
hours, the Germans blanketed the 5th and 6th 
Brigade lines (the former were holding the line 
to the left of the latter) with a heavy artillery and 
trench mortar bombardment for eight minutes.29 
Ten minutes before the 6th Brigade was supposed 
to launch its attack, fresh German troops of the 
1st Guards Reserve Division, which had moved 
into position the previous day, hurled themselves 
at the 5th Brigade’s lines in a massive assault. In 
the ensuing chaotic fighting, the 5th Brigade was 
ejected from its trenches. A counterattack, led by 
the 25th Battalion, was able to regain a foothold 
in the original positions later in the morning.30 
As an intelligence report from the 25th Battalion 
recorded:
 A lively scrap ensued in which our men fought 
their way out of the dug-outs, and began to drive 
Germans from our trench…the troops that D 
Company were opposed…were probably the best 
which [we] ever encountered.31 
Ten minutes after the surprise German attack, 
the 6th Brigade launched its assault, only to 
meet advancing German forces in no-man’s-
land, where the fighting was especially brutal. 
As a rifleman in the 31st Battalion later wrote 
of the attack: 
…a battle royal took place. After bombing and 
bayonet work, we slowly forced the enemy 
back, meeting another line later on. After some 
desperate fighting we were supposed to have 
reached our objective, but with sadly depleted 
forces. We had, however, to pull back leaving 
outposts composed of bombers and Lewis 
gunners to hold the line.32 
A shell bursts in the outskirts of Lens, August 1917.
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9 For the 6th Brigade, the fighting throughout 
the day was frenzied and vicious, with most of 
the battalions failing to reach their objectives, 
and reserve companies of the 31st, 29th and 
28th Battalions had to be rushed forward to fill 
the gaps in the ranks.33 By noon, the Canadians 
had failed to gain their key objectives – Nabob, 
Cinnabar and Nun’s Alley trenches. By 1600 
hours it was realized that the attack had failed 
and that the 6th Brigade should fall back to its 
original position. The day’s only saving grace 
was that the German forces did not achieve their 
goal of displacing the Canadian lines either.34 
The 2nd Division’s official report said that the 
fighting had been of a more severe nature than 
any previous action by this division, though it 
emphasized that the heavy casualties suffered, 
and failure to gain any of the planned objectives, 
were “compensated for by the very high numbers 
of casualties inflicted on the enemy.”35 The 6th 
Brigade suffered so badly that it had to be pulled 
from the line on 22 August, the 5th Brigade being 
compelled to extend its line to cover the former’s 
front. This was the end of action for the 2nd 
Division in the Lens area.36 
4th Division Attack
The 4th Division also had an arduous time fighting its way into Lens. Their assignment 
was the more daunting – to press on into the 
ruined city centre. The German army had spent 
the last two years setting up defensive positions 
in the rubble of this destroyed city and were well 
prepared when the Canadians launched their 
attack: 
What had originally appeared to be the ruins of 
workingmen’s houses on the Southern edge of 
Lens were discovered to be lined and interlined 
with trussed concrete. The walls were from six 
to eight feet thick and practically impregnable to 
even the heaviest shells. One of these pill boxes, 
armed with a machine-gun could hold up an 
advance on nearly a mile of front.37
 Perhaps this comment exaggerates the 
effectiveness of the machine guns, given that 
their fields of fire were also restricted by rubble, 
but entering this all-but-destroyed city riven 
with underground bunkers and hidden pillboxes 
would be a totally new – and deadly – type of 
warfare for the Canadians.
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Canadian soldiers, some wounded, gather at an aid post during the fighting at Lens, August 1917.
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10
 On the night of 18 August the 10th Brigade 
replaced the 11th Brigade in the front lines 
opposite Lens. The 10th Brigade was supposed to 
storm Lens on the 21st simultaneously with the 
6th Brigade’s attack. However, on 20 August the 
50th Battalion attempted to attack Aloof Trench 
with the hope of gaining a better jumping-off 
point for the next day’s operations.38 Intelligence 
reports from the neighbouring 2nd Division had 
led the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Page, to believe that the Germans opposing them 
were withdrawing and that his men would meet 
weak resistance.39 The attack jumped off in the 
afternoon and artillery was kept to a minimum 
in order to give the Canadians the element of 
surprise. After making initial progress, the 50th 
Battalion assault companies ran into heavy 
opposition.40 The Canadian intelligence had been 
wrong – Aloof Trench was very strongly defended. 
Victor Wheeler, a signaler in the Battalion, later 
described the grim events of 20 August in his 
memoirs: 
We were engaged in nothing less than a battle-
to-the death with an enemy who was equally 
determined that we should not pass. Many 
individual acts of bravery among our heroic 
men were exploits of self sacrifice-sacrifice that 
might, somehow, enable their buddies to go 
forward and gain the Battalion’s objective. Our 
objectives gained, we thought we could hold it 
against counter-move, but the boche[s] decided 
otherwise. He launched a powerful counter-
attack against our decimated ranks with such 
ferocity that his onslaught drove us back to our 
original position.41 
Wheeler’s Battalion lost over 50 men, pulled 
back, and, during the night of 20 August, a 
reserve company was sent forward to replenish 
its ranks for the next day’s main assault. The 
10th Brigade’s intelligence summaries noted that 
the 50th Battalion should not have undertaken 
the operation for it may have jeopardized the 
next day’s assault by alerting the Germans and 
drained the manpower of the Canadians. The 
50th Battalion’s attack showed how unprepared 
the Canadians were for operating in this 
environment. The decision not to use artillery, 
a tool that had insured success in the past, as 
well as poor intelligence and determined German 
resistance had resulted in a bloody setback.42
 The 50th Battalion prepared for their attack 
on 21 August under the heavy German shelling 
that had zeroed in on their location during the 
night of the 20th-21st. The infantry lay in the 
open for 25 minutes under this bombardment 
before beginning their attack, and by the time they 
left the trenches they had already suffered heavy 
casualties. As the Albertans advanced, the ruined 
houses began to spit out machine-gun fire. Only 
a few small parties reached their objectives. The 
50th Battalion was so battered it was forced to 
pull back and regroup. At 1800 hours it tried to 
launch another attack, but this, too, was beaten 
back. It had been a grim, costly affair, and the 
Alberta men had failed to gain any of the day’s 
objectives. The Canadian artillery had been of 
little use against strongly-fortified defensive 
positions in the rubble. The Germans had also 
A Canadian gun emplacement near Lens, August 1917. Artillery generally played a major role
during the Great War, but its effectiveness was limited due to the urban nature of the battlefield.
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11
outwitted the Canadian artillery by launching 
red signal flares similar to those employed by 
the Canadian Corps, so that when the Canadian 
guns responded their shells fell among the 50th 
Battalion’s positions causing even more misery 
(and casualties) among the troops. At day’s end, 
the 50th’s last remaining reinforcements were 
sent up to strengthen its much-thinned ranks.43 
 Four days later, on 25 August, the battalion 
tried once more for their original objectives. This 
time the Canadians were not heavily bombarded 
by the German artillery. Also, the Canadian 
artillery laid down a much larger barrage that 
covered the advance all the way to the first line 
(Aloof trench). Here, the infantry stopped and 
consolidated. This time the Canadians met little 
resistance, suffering only seven wounded, but 
when they pushed patrols forward to gain the 
rest of the objectives, they again came under 
heavy machine gun fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Page 
decided not to advance in numbers (though he 
sent some minor patrols forward), but instead 
consolidate the lines they had gained. The 50th 
Battalion never achieved the initial objectives 
laid out for them on the 21st, and they retired 
that evening, relieved by the 87th Battalion. In 
over four days of fighting they had suffered 370 
casualties, nearly half of their strength.44
 Attacks by the 46th and 47th Battalions, 
also part of the 4th Division’s operation on the 
21st, started badly. The Germans had heavily 
shelled their positions during the previous night. 
Every officer in the 46th Battalion’s leftmost 
company became a casualty and others from 
the reserve battalions had to be rushed forward 
to replace them. Shaken by their ordeal, the 
troops left their lines at the designated time of 
0435 hours and quickly entered the shattered 
neighbourhoods of Lens. They promptly found 
themselves engaged in house-to-house fighting. 
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12
Any buildings the Germans had not fortified were 
booby-trapped.45 As an anonymous Canadian 
participant recounted:
Bombs would be concealed in small dugout 
stoves, with wires attached to the doors. 
Naturally enough, a door would be opened 
sooner or later, and immediately the safety pin 
would be released and the bomb would explode, 
doing considerable damage to the garrison.46 
The fighting through Lens was fierce, but both 
battalions were consolidating their objectives by 
early evening,47 a success that was unmatched 
along the rest of the Canadian lines that day.
The Green Crassier
Despite the complete failure of 2nd Division’s initiative, with the success that the 46th and 
47th Battalions had achieved, corps headquarters 
believed that the second part of the advance into 
Lens, the attack on the Green Crassier, would 
be feasible. The struggle for the Green Crassier 
would be the defining element in the Canadian 
Corps’ battle to capture Lens. If taken, the 
Canadians would have three sides of the city 
enclosed, and they expected that this would make 
the German position in Lens untenable and force 
the enemy to withdraw.48 The Green Crassier was 
a large mound of mine refuse, located between 
the railway station and the Lens Canal, and 350 
yards to the right of the 10th Brigade’s position. A 
private in the 44th Battalion described it as a:
Tremendous thing, it stood up as a land mark, 
it stood about roughly 500 yards to the side, in 
the shape of triangles, heart shaped, with the 
points down towards us, and toward the Lens-
Arras railway. Now they had the damned Souches 
[Souchez] River right near that place and it 
had flooded the whole area and the crassier 
something like an arrow point ….49 
 Urban warfare is particularly brutal and 
arduous, and the Canadian Corps had no 
experience in this sort of fighting. The tactics of 
heavy and accurate artillery support and storming 
trenches was of little use in Lens – the heavy 
casualties that the Canadian rifle companies 
had been taking in the Lens area should 
have confirmed this. Brigade and divisional 
commanders seem not to have recognized how 
much harder the fighting would be. Instead, they 
believed that the tactics of a limited bite-and-hold 
and artillery-intensive attack would succeed in 
gaining the Green Crassier.50 The 4th Division 
headquarters (Major-General David Watson and 
his senior staff officer, Brigadier William Ironside) 
as well as Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie and 
Canadian Corps headquarters should have re-
evaluated what they wanted to achieve at Lens. 
Especially in light of the overwhelming failures in 
the last couple of days of fighting to gain any sort 
of foothold in Lens, and seen whether these goals 
warranted the probable expenditure of life. After 
nearly a week of fighting in Lens – a combination 
of sporadic attacks and one major assault – the 
Canadians realized that the Germans were 
heavily fortified in the city and willing to fight for 
it. For Lieutenant Burns, a signal officer for the 
4th Division, the memory of the tenacity of the 
defence against even the earliest probing attacks 
into Lens was only too clear in his memoirs: 
“[we] push[ed] forward fighting patrols toward 
Lens to test enemy defence there (which it turned 
out was solid).”51 The decision to capture the 
Green Crassier was left to the 10th Brigade’s 
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Planning for the attack on the Green Crassier was carried out by Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th Canadian Division (left); his 
senior staff officer, Brigadier William Ironsides (centre), and the commander of 10th Brigade, Brigadier-General Edward Hilliam (right).
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13
Various views of the “Green 
Crassier” – the objective of the 
10th Brigade attack. Though 
these photos were taken in 
1919, they clearly show how 
the Crassier dominates the 
terrain, along with the flooding 
of the Souchez River. 
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Planning for the attack on the Green Crassier was carried out by Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th Canadian Division (left); his 
senior staff officer, Brigadier William Ironsides (centre), and the commander of 10th Brigade, Brigadier-General Edward Hilliam (right).
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commander, Brigadier-General E. Hilliam, who 
was confident that the risks involved were worth 
the opportunity to have the high point to the south 
of Lens in Canadian hands.52 
 The 44th Battalion, a Manitoba unit, was 
chosen to attack the Green Crassier. Commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel R.D. Davies, it had been 
kept in reserve throughout the fighting in August. 
The plan was to push forward to the Green 
Crassier, and once it was taken, twist left to face 
the central district of Lens.53 This advance would 
be carried out on a very narrow approach to the 
Green Crassier – on one side was a river, and the 
Germans held most of the surrounding built up 
areas except for a tight corridor that intelligence 
predicted the Canadian attackers would be able 
to secure. This route passed by Fosse St. Louis, 
one of the many pithead installations scattered 
around the area. Scouts reported, erroneously 
as it turned out, that this area and the route to 
the Crassier were relatively clear of Germans.54 
Captain Marshall, a junior officer in the 44th, 
later recounted his own astonished reaction to 
the plan: 
…a communiqué came out from Company HQ 
said, to all Company commanders…to submit 
plans to take attack and attack the Green 
Crassier as a Company operation. Well it was 
such a colossal proposition – this man Bruff, 
wonderful man, kept everybody in excellent 
humour, and so I thought it was a joke…and 
answered it in a joking way, figuring it was the 
thing to do. Told them, well the thing to do was…
to attack in single file mind you up the railway 
embankment and have a couple of battleships 
and submarines. Well I got snapped up so fast 
on that, it would make your hair curl so I missed 
that show. I was under open arrest.55 
 Both corps and divisional headquarters 
believed they could take the Green Crassier, 
surrounded by a maze of ruined buildings, with 
the same tactics that had been used successfully 
at Hill 70 – employing an infantry attack 
supported by a heavy artillery bombardment. 
Messages sent from corps headquarters on 19 
August confirmed this: “The most important 
Artillery target in our operation is the GREEN 
CRASSIER. This must be thoroughly isolated 
both during and after [emphasis in the original] 
the operation.” Another communiqué from Corps 
Headquarters reiterated the necessity of proper 
artillery coverage: “Too much cannot be made of 
neutralizing the Green Crassier after the assault 
has succeeded because it dominates the right 
flank and casualties will be heavy if it is not 
properly dealt with.”56 Major-General Watson 
informed Brigadier-General Hilliam that if the 
46th and 47th achieved their goals, the 44th 
Battalion would attack the Green Crassier. “A” 
and “D” Companies would lead the assault with 
“C” Company held back as reinforcements. “B” 
Company was unavailable as it had been used to 
reinforce the 46th Battalion in the previous day’s 
fighting.57
 Sending in only one undermanned battalion 
to take such a crucial target was one of the 
first errors the 10th Brigade made in its attack 
plan. Around 2300 hours on 22 August it was 
decided that the 44th Battalion would need more 
support and that elements of the 50th Battalion 
would be sent to aid in the assault on the Green 
Crassier. However, through the chaos at the front 
of Aloof Trench, the 50th Battalion could not get 
organized in time. As Lieutenant-Colonel Page 
recounted: “About 2:45 I received a message from 
Major Graham timed at 2:20 informing me that 
he was not going to attack. It was impossible for 
me to make other arrangements between then 
and 3:00.”58 The 44th would attack the Green 
Crassier alone.
 Early in the morning of 23 August a Canadian 
patrol reported that Fosse St. Louis was not as 
weakly held as intelligence had been reporting. 
The 44th Battalion decided that once the attack 
started they would send two platoons to deal 
with it while the rest of the battalion headed 
for the Green Crassier.59 The Canadian artillery 
thundered to life at 0300 hours when the 44th 
Battalion left their trenches and began their 
approach to the Green Crassier. The leading 
forces met only sporadic German resistance on 
the route to the Green Crassier and left these 
to be mopped up by the following companies. 
By 0330 hours, “D” Company was on top of 
its objective, the Crassier’s summit, and “A” 
Company was at the base of the hill, keeping 
communications open with “D” Company.60 Their 
initial success gave the Canadians a false sense 
of achievement.
 While this attack was unfolding, the two 
platoons attacking Fosse St. Louis had met with 
severe resistance. Machine guns had begun 
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firing from buildings surrounding the pithead, 
and the Canadian troops were struggling to 
make headway. Reinforcements were rushed to 
the pithead and at 0830 hours the Canadians 
reported that they had a foothold in the area. 
This success, however, proved short lived. “B” 
Company, which was holding Alpaca Trench, a 
narrow route to the Green Crassier, desperately 
needed help, and the troops attacking the pithead 
were pulled back to aid them.61
 As the hours passed, the Canadian units 
below the Green Crassier increasingly came 
under attack. It was discovered that the Germans 
had tunnels leading to pithead installations and 
were funneling troops through them.62 Private 
Reid, a veteran of the fighting, subsequently 
described how ineffective the Canadian artillery 
was in this battle:
Well then they could put all their forces in there 
and you could pound it for 48 hours with the 
biggest barrage that you had and it made no 
effect you see. Well the minute the barrage lifted 
these Germans would come out you see and 
set up their guns. Because I know from one 
dugout they had set [the] gun that the minute 
you popped your head around the corner, they 
just plugged you.63 
 A foundation of the corps’ doctrine in the 
summer of 1917 was the ability of artillery to 
break up enemy counterattacks and to neutralize 
their defences prior to a Canadian attack. This 
was not possible in Lens. The Germans hid in 
their tunnels and bunkers waiting out the artillery 
bombardments. Once these lifted they would 
emerge to man their weapons. The problem 
was that the Canadians did not know where 
the bunkers and tunnels were in this urban 
environment, and usually only identified their 
locations when they came under fire.64 Also, 
the Germans, with their hidden fortifications 
in Lens, were able to call down artillery upon 
themselves. In the early afternoon, the Germans 
pulled back to their tunnels and brought down a 
fierce bombardment on the Canadian positions 
at Alpaca Trench and the Fosse, rendering the 
Canadian situation below the Crassier untenable, 
and a withdrawal was ordered. The Canadians 
then counterattacked and regained Alpaca 
Trench, although throughout the day it kept 
switching hands as one counterattack followed 
another.65 
 It became clear in the afternoon that the 
Canadian assault on the Green Crassier had 
failed, and the Canadians would not be forcing 
the Germans out of the central and southern 
parts of Lens. The 44th Battalion reported that 
German defences in Fosse St. Louis (shown here in 1919) took a heavy toll on the attacking troops from the 44th 
Battalion. The rubble worked to the Germans’ advantage by hiding their defensive works and making it difficult for the 
Canadians to move forward.
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elements of four German divisions were operating 
against them.66 Brigadier-General Hilliam had 
no choice but to order the withdrawal for the 
Battalion because of the casualties suffered 
and the little ground held. Obeying the order, 
however, was impossible for “D” Company on top 
of the Green Crassier, now cut off from the units 
below them. Having quickly reached the top of 
the Crassier, the men had turned their efforts to 
consolidating their position. Unfortunately, the 
surface of the Crassier was loose slag and rail 
tracks, and it was impossible to dig dugouts and 
trenches. At 0430 hours, they had sent a message 
asking for ammunition, as well as sandbags and 
timber to build some sort of defensive position. 
The supplies, however, could not be delivered 
because of heavy fighting below them.67
 As the night descended on the Green Crassier, 
all communications between “D” Company and 
the rest of the Canadian Corps were cut off. Going 
up or down the Crassier became impossible as 
the routes were covered on three sides by enemy 
machine gun fire while the fourth side was a cliff 
which fell away into the river below. German 
mortars and artillery kept relentless pressure 
on the Manitobans’ position atop the Crassier 
throughout the night.68 Ed Garrison, a private 
in the 44th Battalion, remembered trying to get 
a message to the top of the Crassier: 
They were trying to get across with the messages…
and we couldn’t do anything about it really. There 
was a sniper there and we couldn’t do anything 
about it and then we got back to Battalion and 
we stayed there all night…”69 
 No attempt to relieve the men on the Crassier 
was made the following day as it had been decided 
that any attempt would cost too many lives. The 
survivors, though completely cut off, continued 
to fight resolutely; holding off strong German 
parties trying to take their position throughout 
the night, but by the afternoon of the 24th the 
men had run out of ammunition and Mills bombs 
and the survivors were forced to surrender. Allen 
Hart, another private in the 44th, recounted 
what the men clinging to the Crassier had gone 
through: 
Well of course everything was anything but lovely 
because these boys got over there and it was - it 
was not a small show, it was a big show, and it 
hadn’t been realized for some reason or other, 
hadn’t been realized how big an undertaking it 
was, so these boys got up there ... those that 
weren’t killed were captured.70 
In 36 hours of fighting, the 44th suffered 260 
casualties including 70 who had been taken 
prisoner. 
 With the 50th Battalion finally consolidating 
Aloof Trench on the 25th, the fighting in the 
Lens/Hill 70 area was done.71 In all the Canadians 
had suffered almost 4,000 casualties from 21-25 
August.72 The corps had not achieved any of its 
initial objectives and had finally withdrawn from 
the city.73
 Despite the corps’ bloody setback, General 
Henry Horne wanted the Canadians to attack 
Lens again in September and the 4th Division was 
designated to prepare for this. He believed that 
a converging attack southeast from Hill 70 and 
northeast from the other high point overlooking 
Lens, the Sallaumines Hills, would allow Lens’ 
capture. This attack never materialized as the 
fighting in the Ypres Salient was going badly, and 
GHQ ordered the Canadian Corps north to take 
part in that ferocious battle. The Germans would 
hold Lens for another year until the summer of 
1918.
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Canadian troops pass by German concrete bunkers in Lens.
Two Canadian soldiers exit a 
German tunnel on the outskirts 
of Lens. The network of tunnels 
allowed the Germans to remain 
safely underground while their 
artillery pummelled the Canadian 
attackers on the surface.
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 The Canadian attack on Lens was a failure 
which no amount of rationalization can sweep 
away. It was the first time Canadians had fought 
in an urban environment, and they suffered 
heavily because they did not come up with new 
tactics to deal with the difficulties associated 
with combat in a warren of ruined buildings and 
streets. The Canadian Corps still believed that 
intensive artillery and machine gun barrages, 
which had been so effective at Vimy Ridge and 
Hill 70, would lead any infantry attack to success. 
However, these tactics were negated by the defence 
afforded by city rubble easily utilized by the 
German defenders as barriers and strongpoints. 
As well, tunnels throughout the city allowed the 
Germans to move troops safely and quickly to 
critical areas and even infiltrate behind Canadian 
positions. Also preparation comparable to that 
made by the troops at Vimy Ridge and Hill 70, 
where they had known their objectives weeks in 
advance and trained extensively in the tactics to 
capture them, was not carried out at Lens.
 There was also a failure of intelligence. 
Reconnaissance patrols found it difficult 
– indeed, nearly impossible – to penetrate into 
Lens with its maze of tunnels and ruined houses 
converted into bunkers. One lesson emphasized 
in an after-battle report for Hill 70 was the 
importance of sound intelligence and the need 
to act upon it “without hesitation.”74 But the 
4th Division possessed a very sketchy picture 
of what the Canadian infantry would face, and 
put too much stock in the optimistic – but sadly 
incomplete – information it had. The policy of 
acting “without hesitation” on initial intelligence 
had often worked well in traditional trench 
warfare situations, but when used in Lens it, too, 
could lead to disaster, a good example being the 
50th Battalion’s ill-fated attack on 20 August. 
 To have achieved victory would have called 
for a much larger force and resulted in still 
heavier casualties. The 2nd and 4th Divisions 
were waging a battle they could not win in an 
urban environment using the same tactics that 
had been successful a few days earlier at Hill 70. 
Fortunately for the Canadian infantry, Lens was 
the last time they would be sent to fight a well-
prepared, determined, and reinforced enemy in 
a built-up area.75
  The Hill 70 and Lens operations were Currie’s 
first tests as corps commander. With Hill 70 in 
Canadian hands, why did Currie press the attack 
into Lens so quickly? He could have pursued a 
variety of different options, the most obvious 
being simply to shell Lens into submission, 
taking advantage of the strategic high ground 
his men had seized. Currie may have believed 
that after the heavy artillery bombardment from 
mid-July to 15 August, with the majority of shells 
being directed at Lens, any German defences had 
already been pounded to so much masonry dust. 
Surely the Germans would have done the logical 
thing and withdrawn. Instead the enemy, with 
well-prepared defensive positions (and Canadian 
gunners inadvertently creating additional barriers 
with every barrage), had chosen to fight, and the 
first Canadian probing attacks confirmed this. 
Nevertheless, the Canadians proceeded with their 
plan for a major assault that in retrospect was 
doomed from the start. 
 Thereafter, everything was done by half-
measures, even if inadvertantly as when the 
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of Lens. The network of tunnels 
allowed the Germans to remain 
safely underground while their 
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lack of communications between battalions 
and brigade headquarters resulted in the 44th 
Battalion being sent alone to capture the critical 
feature of the Green Crassier. Even with two 
battalions the Canadians would have been 
severely undermanned for the daunting task, 
however. Perhaps the narrow passage of attack 
allowed only two battalion to pass, but that also 
should have raised alarms. 
 On 29 August Major-General Watson made 
a written assessment of the 10th Brigade’s 
performance during the attack on Lens. In it 
he confirms that poor communication was the 
reason for the 50th Battalion’s failure to support 
the 44th Battalion: “Through a misunderstanding 
this attack never materialized.”76 Though the 50th 
Battalion would have helped the 44th Battalion, 
it was so badly beaten up from the previous days’ 
fighting that it would not have made a difference 
in the outcome of the attack on the Green 
Crassier. Brigadier-General Hilliam, evidently did 
not realize that this was a major operation, and 
consequently made a critical error when he did 
not call for more than two battalions. Also, the 
50th battalion was told of its involvement in the 
battle much too late for it to have been prepared. 
It is, moreover, puzzling that the 50th Battalion 
was not then sent up later in the morning as 
reinforcements. Major-General Watson left the 
decision to attack the Green Crassier up to 
Hilliam, therefore Brigadier-General Hilliam 
bears responsibility for the sacrifice of the 44th 
Battalion. As such, the 10th Brigade’s lack of 
communication with the battalions was not only 
to blame. Hilliam’s decision when the brigade 
was unprepared led to the massacre of the 44th 
Battalion.
 A compelling argument for the attack into 
Lens could be that Currie was feeling pressure 
from Field Marshal Haig and General Horne to 
push the attack until the city fell. As has already 
been pointed out, Horne, after the Lens operation 
was called off, told Currie to prepare to attack 
again, an attack which was cancelled only when it 
became necessary to free up the Canadian Corps 
to participate in the fighting at Passchendaele. 
Still, there is no direct evidence that Currie was 
reluctant to attack the city. 
 Perhaps this period was the beginning of 
Currie’s own “learning curve.” As an untested 
corps commander, did he feel insecure in his 
position and give in to his superiors, having 
gained an important advantage by taking Hill 70? 
It is also possible that overconfidence helped to 
propel the Canadian Corps towards their assault 
on Lens. The success at Vimy Ridge in April, 
coupled with the overwhelming success achieved 
at Hill 70, could have given Currie and his senior 
staff officers and commanders an understandable 
sense of hubris, leading them to believe that if 
they just kept on pushing the Germans, they 
would succeed. 
Top: Canadian troops in trenches at Lens.
Bottom: The remains of a German concrete, iron and 
pitprop reinforced house near Lens.
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 Currie, as senior Commander of the Canadian 
Corps, must shoulder some responsibility for the 
Green Crassier battle, as he did not call off the 
corps’ operations in Lens after the disastrous 
events of 21 August. It is understandable that 
Currie did not want to delay the attack on Lens 
any further, as there had already been a month 
heavy shelling of Lens, and further artillery fire 
would not result in a better outcome. However, 
he should not have allowed Canadian troops 
to continue to attack until the 25th. As Currie 
matured and acquired more experience as a 
corps commander in the latter part of 1917 
and through 1918, he certainly showed sounder 
judgment. This is clearly demonstrated in his 
behaviour during the German spring 1918 
offensives and the way he dictated how the 
Canadians would be used in the “Last Hundred 
Days” campaign. 
 The twin battles of Hill 70, a stunning 
success, and Lens, a bloody setback that did 
nothing to disrupt German deployments, are 
prime illustrations of the position of the Canadian 
Corps in their “learning curve” in the summer of 
1917. Lens, despite the tendency of historians to 
gloss over the full scale of the failure, provides 
evidence that even this renowned and capable 
formation could make fatal miscalculations. 
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